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COMMENTS
which should embrace the names of such persons as were known to the electors
in their district.3 9
In fact, the thirty-day residence requirement would probably be inter-
preted as directory only, for where a statute does not declare the perform-
ance of certain duties by public officials in connection with the election to
be essential to the validity of the election, it will be regarded as mandatory
if such matters affect the real merits, but will be considered directory
only, and not vital to the election, unless they are such, in themselves, as
to change or render doubtful the result. 40
As a result of the aforementioned, it can be deduced that the altering of
ward boundaries will have little affect upon the legality of an election so
long as the precincts are not part of more than one ward.
The most important thing about redistricting wards is to redistrict the
'wards, and secure as practicably as possible, equal population in each ward
so as to secure equal representation, as well as an equal vote, in the affairs
of the municipal government.
41
39 Donovan v. Comerford, 332 Ill. 230, 233, 163 N.E. 657, 658 (1928).
4o People ex rel. Agnew v. Graham, 267 Ill. 426, 108 N.E. 699 (1915).
41 Hammond v. Young, 117 N.E. 2d 227 (1953).
WIRE-TAP EVIDENCE: AN AREA OF ADMISSIBILITY?
The admissibility or inadmissibility of wire-tap evidence is a much
discussed topic. Inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court has favored
the exclusion of this type of evidence, that is the rule followed in the fed-
eral courts today.' Those who favor the inadmissibility of wire-tap evi-
dence contend that federal legislation such as Section 605 of Title 47,2 and
the interpretation given it by the United States Supreme Court 3 were
necessary to protect the individual's right of privacy. It is well established
that privacy is the thing which is being protected and that the divulgence
of wire-tapping data is an invasion of privacy. 4 On the other hand, though
such protection of privacy is necessary it should not, and Congress did
not intend it to, hamper or obstruct the exercise of the governmental po-
lice powers.
The Nardone case sets forth what is the basic problem:
It is urged that a construction be given the section (605) which would ex-
clude federal agents since it is improbable Congress intended to hamper and
impede the activities of the government in the detection and punishment of
1 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
2 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp., 1956).
3 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
4 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Diamond v. United States, 108 F.2d
859 (C.A. 6th, 1938); Accord: 41 Am. Jur., Privacy S 29 (1942).
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crime. The answer is that the question is one of policy. Congress may have
thought it less important that some offenders should go unwhipped of justice
than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical
standards and destructive of personal liberty. 5
In other words, what must be achieved in the area is a balance between
the exercise of the governmental police powers and the protection of the
right of privacy. It is the purpose of this comment to show that there is an
area, though limited, in which wire-tap evidence should be allowed as it
would not result in an infringement upon privacy or an over-exercise of
police powers.
The Olmstead case6 would be a proper starting point in laying a his-
torical foundation. The United States Supreme Court there held that the
admission of wire-tap evidence was not a violation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments of the United States Constitution which protect one from
illegal search and seizure and self-incrimination, respectively. The Court
observed:
If, in any circumstance, obtaining evidence by tapping wires is deemed an
objectional governmental practice it may be regulated or forbidden by statute
or avoided by officers of the law, but clearly the Constitution does not forbid it
unless it involves actual unlawful entry into a house.7
The Court went on to say that the admissibility of evidence at common
law is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it is obtained
and the rule applies where there is no constitutional violation.
As a result of the Olmstead decision, Congress passed the "Wire-Tap
Statute"" which made it a crime to "intercept and divulge" interstate
communications. Later by court decision the statute was held to apply
to intrastate communications also.9 The statute, itself, is penal; as a rule
of evidence it is an interpretation by the courts. 10
Then, in 1950, United States v. Coplon" asserted that possibly the
mantle of protection afforded by this statute was too broad:
The fact that Congress has repeatedly refused to ban wire-tapping may justify
the reasonable inference that the enactment of Section 605, Title 47, was for the
purpose of preserving the integrity, inviolate, of legitimate commercial transac-
tions and that it was never intended to impair the police power of the govern-
ment, so essential to its preservation, by opening wide channels and avenues of
our diversified communication system to violators of the law.1 2
5 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937).
6 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7 Ibid., at 452. 8 Authority cited note 2 supra.
9 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
10 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
1191 F.Supp. 867, 185 F. 2d 629 (C.A. 2d, 1950).
12 Ibid., at 871.
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The view expressed in the Coplon case was given effect in the decision
rendered in United States v. Sugden.13 The defendants were there con-
victed of violating the immigration laws. Evidence obtained through the
monitoring of the defendant's private radio system was held admissible
because the party was in the unlawful use of the system, i.e. though the
radio was licensed the operator was not. The court stated that "to throw
a mantle of protection provided by Section 605 over an outlaw broadcast
is to abandon reason.' u 4  It therefore concluded that to be protected
under the "wire-tap statute," one must be in the legal use of the com-
munication system and that in the absence of such legal use no right of
privacy exists.
Having laid the historical foundation of the theory, the logical result
when this theory is applied to two specific federal statutes should be
noted. Extortion or an attempt to extort by interstate communication is
made a crime by Section 875 of Title 18 just as the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate a fraud by wire is made a crime by Section 1343 of Title 18.
These two statutes set out situations in which the use of a communication
system for such a purpose is made unlawful, i.e. an illegal use just as it is to
operate a radio without a license.
Therefore, anyone violating these two sections of Title 18, "fraud by
wire" or "extortion by interstate communication," would not be entitled
under the Sugden decision to the right of privacy protected by Section
605, and a full disclosure of such outlaw communications would therefore
be admissible in court.
From this rationale it would follow that once a communication was
proven to be unlawful or illegal, any information within the communica-
tion would be admissible even though it did not apply to the specific
criminal acts but rather to other acts.
At first glance, this may appear to be too simple a syllogism to have a
solid foundation. As pointed out initially, the problem reduces itself to
achieving a balance between the exercise of the governmental police pow-
ers and the protection of the right of privacy, with the least detriment to
society or the individual. In the situations previously discussed, a balance
appears to have been achieved. Where no right of privacy exists, there can
be no infringement upon this right. At the same time, there is no unneces-
sary impediment to the exercise of the police power.
Another theory favoring admissibility in these limited situations is based
upon rules of statutory construction and interpretation. Since statutes are
looked upon as parts of a whole system and will be construed together
especially where they relate to the same subject, 15 as communication
13 226 F.2d 281 (C.A. 9th, 1955). 14 Ibid., at 285.
15 United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188 (1939); 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, S 362 (1944);
Crawford, Statutory Construction § 227 (1940).
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systems, these three statutes, "wire-tap," "fraud by wire" and "extortion
by interstate communication" must be looked upon in relation to each
other. Also, there is the rule which keeps the judiciary from exceeding its
powers and invading the province of the legislature that intended to enact
an effective law and not to have done a "vain and meaningless" act.16
Finally, there is the rule that related statutes must be construed together so
as to give effect to both and not to render one meaningless. 17
In applying these rules to the "fraud by wire" and "extortion by inter-
state communication" statutes and in the light of the wire-tap statute, it is
to be observed that to hold Section 605 applicable to situations involving
the other two statutes would render these acts of Congress "futile" or
"nugatory," for, as a practical matter, without this means of proof, they
are virtually unenforceable.
In conclusion then, since the general rule on this topic is a "matter of
policy," the Olmstead case never having been overruled, the admissibility
of wire-tap evidence where it can be had without a violation of this
"policy" should be permitted.
10 Armstrong v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938), rehearing denied 305 U.S.
675 (1939); 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, § 357 (1944); Crawford, Statutory Construction, 5 177(1940).
17United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
THE ILLINOIS INNKEEPER AND THE
GOODS OF HIS GUESTS
It is the duty of an innkeeper or hotel proprietor to keep safely the
goods of his guests, so that no loss might occur by reason of the fault or
negligence of the innkeeper or his servants. This is a well-recognized com-
mon law rule for breach of which he is liable to his guest for the loss
sustained.'
This rule, originating centuries ago when travel was by horseback or
stage and travelers were easy prey, has always been predicated upon the
theory of public policy. In this day of modern travel and accommoda-
tions, argument in support of the ancient rule would seem specious, yet
the rule has been preserved, nearly intact, for over 600 years. The major-
ity of jurisdictions today, in the absence of some statutory modifications,
still hold the innkeeper to be practically an insurer as to the goods of his
guests, absolved from liability only when he affirmatively shows that the
loss resulted from an act of God, or was caused by the public enemy, the
inherent nature of the goods themselves, or by the contributory fault of
the guest.2
In some jurisdictions, including Illinois, the rule is ameliorated in that
1 Stoll v. Almon C. Judd Co., 106 Conn. 551, 138 Atl. 479 (1927).
2 Ibid. Accord: Morgan v. Raney, 6 H. & N. 265, 158 Eng. Rep. 109 (1861); Richmond
v. Smith, 8 BE.C. 9,108 Eng. Rep. 946 (1828).
